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IRA'S AND HOUSEHOLD SAVING
REVISITED: SOME NEW EVIDENCE
ABSTRACF
The effectiveness of tax-favored savings accounts in raising national savings depends
crucially upon the willingness of households to reduce consumption in order to fmance
contributions to these accounts. The debate over the tax deductibility of IRA's has centered on
whether IRA contributions represented new savings or reshuffled assets. We devise a test to
distinguish between these two hypotheses where we compare the behavior of households which
just opened an IRA account with that of households which already had an IRA account. Our test
accounts for any unobservable heterogeneity across the two groups. We find evidence that
supports the view that households financed their IRA contributions primarily through reductions
in their stocks of other assets. Our results indicate that less than 20% of IRA contributions
represented addition to national savings.
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The decline in personal and national saving rates in the US during the 1980's has
stimulated a lively debate on saving incentives and, in particular, on the effectiveness of the
tax-favored savings account. Many have proposed expanding the tax incentives for
retirement savings (such as IRA's or 401(k)'s) to achieve increased private savings.
In this paper, we address the issue of whether the increase in IRA contributions that
occurred between 1982 and 1986 was primarily new savings or wiaether households merely
reshuffled their existing assets to take advantage of the tax benefits of these accounts. We
present evidence that supports the idea that reshuffling explains this increase in contributions
to IRA's.
Most economists and policy makers would agree that national saving was 'too low' in
the 1980's. To effectively raise national saving, a plan that includes tax incentives must
increase private saving by more than the amount of lost government revenue. Therefore,
evidence that households primarily reshuffle is evidence that tax incentives for retirement
saving are not an effective way to increase national savings.
As there is little consensus on the model that best describes saving behavior, the issue
of the effectiveness of tax incentives in raising national saving is mainly an empiricalone.
Unfortunately, empirically it is vety difficult to assess the effectiveness of these incentive
schemes. From an aggregate stand point, we know that personal saving rates have continued
to decline even after Congress implemented fiscal incentives for saving. Of course, it is
conceivable that without these incentives saving rates would have declined even more. From
a microeconomic stand point, we know that households participating in these schemes save
more than households not participating in them. It is extremely difficult, however, to
establish how much the same households would have saved without the tax incentive. A
legitimate hypothesis is that participation in IRA accounts is simply an indicator of a high
propensity to save and that participants would have saved approximately the same amount
without the tax incentives. If so, these tax incentives merely represent a transfer from
taxpayers to savers.
Authors have approached the question of whether the large amount of IRA
contributions that occurred from 1982 to 1986 came from decreased consumption or from2
other assets in three ways. First, there are econometric estimates of formal structural models
of the household savings decision such as Venti and Wise (1986, 1987, 1990, 1991, 1992)
and GaleandScholz (1994). Others such as Burman, Cordes, and Ozanne (1990) draw
inferences basedupon anexamination of what types of households contribute to IRA's. This
type of analysis relies on thefactthat thetaxincentives of IRAdeductibilitywill affect some
households more than others. A third way to answer this question is to directly examine the
behavior of households which contribute to IRA's. This approach is taken by Feenberg and
Skinner (1989), Engen, Gale, and SchoLz (1994), and is the approach we take here.
We compare the behavior of two groups of IRA contributors: 'new' contributors --
householdswhich just opened an IRA account —and'old' contributors —householdswhich
previously had made contributions. We can identif' the effect of the tax incentives for
retirement savings because the behavior of these two groups is Likely to differ depending
upon whether households reshuffle their existing assets into IRA's. In particular, if the tax
incentives lead to increased private savings, we would expect households to reduce
consumption to finance contributions when they open an IRA accotmt. If the tax incentives
lead to portfolio reshuffling then we would expect households toy decrease their
stocks of non-IRA assets when they open an IRA account. Given that both groups participate
in IRA's, both show a 'taste' for saving. Therefore, the problems of unobserved
heterogeneity that have plagued comparisons between the changes in non-IRA assets of
contributors and non-contributors are less likely to arise.' As discussed below, in comparing
these groups we account for any differences in their unobservable tastes for saving and
discuss whether these differences can explain our results.
We find strong evidence that, during the 1982-1986 period, households reshuffled
their existing assets into IRA's as opposed to reducing their consumption. While it is
conceivable that unobserved heterogeneity could explain some of our results, we find this
possibility extremely unlikely for reasons discussed below.
'Venti and Wise (1990), for example, use the CEX to compare the non-IRA saving of
IRA contributors with that of non-contributors.3
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
Many papers address the issue of whether IRA's induced households to increase their
saving. There are, in general, three approaches to this problem: formal models, studies of
the typesofhouseholds which contribute to IRA's, and direct examinations of household
behavior. Venti and Wise (1986, 1987, 1990, 1991, 1992) estimate formal models of
household saving behavior using many different data sets including the CEX.theSIPP, and
the SCF. In each of these papers, Venti and Wise adopt a functional form for savings
behavior that specifically allowsIRA saving to be a distinct commodity from other forms of
saving. They find that most households finance their IRA contributions through reductions in
consumption rather than through reductions in other forms of saving.
The model of household saving chosen by' Venti and Wise purposefully departs from
the classical life-cycle model in which different forms of saving are substitutes for each
other. Unfortunately, the model they choose is ad hoc in that it is not the result of any
consumer optimization problem, a point made by Deaton (1988) and Gravelle (1990).
Furthermore, Venti and Wise do not account for unobserved heterogeneity across households
in respect to savings behavior (see Kotlikoff (1990)).
The other prominent structural model of IRA savings is that of Gale and Scholz
(1994). They estiniate a 'typical' life-cycle model and find that little if any of the increase in
IRA contributions would have been new saving. Gale and Scholz also specifically account
for heterogeneity in their model. Both the Gale and Scholz model and the Venti and Wise
model require strong functional form assumptions for identification.
There is little room in the life-cycle model for IRA's to represent new saving. The
intertemporal allocation of consumption (and therefore saving) depends on its intertemporal
price, i.e., the interest rate. However, as is well known, the income and substitution effects
of changes in the interest rate will have opposite signs and result in an overall ambiguous
effect on consumption.2 Furthermore, even if the curvature of the utility function is such that
2Engen, Gale, and Scholz (1994) simulate a life-cycle model which displays almost no
short-mn response in savings to IRA and 401(k) tax incentives. However, their simulations4
an increase in the interest rate leads to a decrease in current consumption, the tax
deductibility of IRA contributions (with a limit to the contribution) only will increase the
saving of consumers in particular regions of the intertemporal budget constraint. Under the
life-cycle model, only households which do not save or which save little will, perhaps, have
an incentive to increase their saving in response to the tax incentives of IRA's. Thus,
several studies have examined the composition of IRA contributors. The idea is that if an
IRA contributing household is at the contribution limit or has saved a lot previously to saving
via IRA's, it is unlikely that this household has any incentive to increase its saving in
response to IRA's. Thus, these studies use the fraction of IRAcontributorsthat are limit
contributors or that have large stocks of assets as an indication of the effectiveness of IRA's
in increasing saving.
Burman, Cordes, and Ozanne (1990) use the IRS-Michigan Tax Panel to examine the
composition of IRA contributors. They fmd that most IRA contributions were made by limit
contributors. They also report that these limit contributors had higher incomes and higher
wealth than non-contributors and non-limit contributors, implying that it is likely that most
contributions came from households with no additional incentive to save as a result of IRA's.
Ozanne (1994) provides further evidence on this point. He shows that, in addition to being
primarily limit contributors, few households eligible to contribute did and most contributors
had sizable assets holding and were older than non-contributors.3
A third approach to answer this question is to directly examine the behavior of
households which contribute to IRA's in order to determine whether their contributions caine
from decreased consumption. Feenberg and Skinner (1989), using the IRS-Michigan Tax
Panel, compare IRA contributors' holdings of taxable assets with those of non-contributors.
They find that IRA contributors increased their non-IRA asset holdings more than non-
contributors did during the period when contributions were tax deductible. Feenberg and
Skinner interpret this evidence as showing that households did not substitute other assets for
do display a long-mn response.
16percentof households eligible to contribute to IRA's did. Whether this fraction
represents 'few' or 'many' households is debatable.5
IRA's.However, as many authors have noted, households which save tend to save in all
forms. Thus, it is likely that in the absence of IRA's the taxable assets holdings of IRA
contributors would have grown just as much as or more than they did. Their fmding could
merely indicate that IRA contributors tend to save in all types of assets while non-
contributors do not.
In a recent study, Engen, Gale, and Scbolz (1994) use the IRS-Michigan Tax Panel to
examine how variation in LRA contribution limits affects household savings.4 They estimate
a fixed effects model in first-differenced form in order to remove the influence of
unobservable, time-invariant characteristics. They fmd no evidence that increases in IRA
contribution limits led to increased household savings.
ifi.OURTEST
Consider a household that can invest in two assets: an IRA and an alternative asset.
One can see that, due to the intertemporal budget constraint, the household must flnance an
increase in IRA assets either by a reduction in other assets (reshuffling) or by an increase in
savings.
If contributions to IRA's do not represent 'new saving,' when a household opens an
IRA account it will move its existing assets into that account to take advantage of the tax
benefits. To the extent that IRA accounts and other forms of assets are not perfect
substitutes, households will hold, in equilibrium, both types of assets. A household will
continue to reshuffle its assets until one of three things occurs: it reaches the equilibrium
point, it reaches the contribution limit, or it nins out of other assets. If a household reaches
its contribution limit, that household will continue to reshuffle in subsequent periods. The
median levels of other assets (checking, savings, securities, and government bonds) for
Engen et a!. (1994) also analyze the effects of incentives of 401(k)'s. Unlike Poterba,
Venti, and Wise (1993) they reach the conclusion that the incentives of these plans have little
or no effect in generating new saving.6
householdsand IRA contributors in our sample are $1050 and $9664 respectively. Thus, it
is likely that many households will quickly reach equilibrium or run out of assets with which
to reshuffle. If this assertion is true, a household that has already been contributing to IRA's
is likelytoadjust the flows rather than the stock of other assets. Therefore, we would
expect that assets other than IRA's should grow faster (or decline more slowly) for 'old'
contributors than for 'new' contributors.
On the other hand, if IRA incentives do stimulate saving, when a household opens an
IRA account it will reduce its consumption. Furthermore, the household will continue to
consume (and save) at the new level indefinitely. Therefore, we expect that households
which start participating in IRA's should decrease their consumption, while households which
have participated for an extended period should not.5 If IRA assets and other forms of assets
are distinct goods as some authors suggest, the household will not alter its stock of other
assets when making IRA contributions.
These considerations suggest some simple tests of the 'reshuffling' hypothesis. We
consider only households which reported making IRA contributions at the end of their
observation period and divide this group into 'new' contributors —householdswhich reported
contributing at the end but not at the beginning of their observation period —and'old'
contributors --householdswhich reported contributing both at the beginningandat the end of
their observation period. We might expect that the differences in unobservable tastes for
savings between 'new' and 'old' contributors would be relatively small compared to that
between contributors and non-conthbutors. If so, we can draw valid inferences on whether
households reshuffle their other assets into IRA's or not.
The Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) provides the ideal data set on which to do
such a test because it provides information on the change in and stock of financial assets at
It should be stressed that this argument is not completely rigorous. It might be argued
that households which were not surprised by the enactment of IRA's tax incentives should
have taken these incentives into account, even before participating, in formulating their
optimal consumption plans and, therefore, consumption should not be affected by the
decision to participate. If one takes this argument literally, one should focus on the
households which started participating in IRA's when the scheme was first introduced.7
the end of the observation period, the consumption flow throughout the period, and annual
income at the beginning and at the end of the period.
To summarize, we will be testing the following restrictions, the first implied by the
'new saving' hypotheses and the second implied by the 'reshuffling' hypotheses:
1) Changes in assets other than IRA's of 'new' contributors are
not different from those of 'old' contributors,
2) Changes in consumption between the beginning and the end
of the observation period should be the same for 'new' and 'old'
contributors.
Thus, we formulate the following empirical model:
=XA y4NEW1
+ (1)
= + YCNEW+ (2)
where is household i's change in assets, AC, is household i's change inconsumption
from the beginning to the end of the observation period,6 X1 is a set of individual and
aggregate control variables and NEW is a dummy variable which equals one if household i is
a 'new' contributor and zero otherwise.
The prediction of the 'new saving' hypothesis is thatiszero while Cisnegative.
The prediction of the 'reshuffling' hypothesis is thatisnegative whileis zero. In this
simple model, both interpretations require that 'new' and 'old' contributors have the same
unobserved tastes for saving.
Of course, it is possible that 'new' contributors are systematically different from 'old'
contributors. The indicator we use to discriminate between the two hypotheses could be
6Note that we are unable to compute the change in savings from the beginning to the end
of the observation period. Annual income is reported at both the beginning and the end of
the observation period. However, the flow of consumption is what is reported throughout
the observation period of one year. Our savings figure is computed by subtracting the sum
of all twelve months of consumption flows from the annual income figure reported at the end
of the observation period. It is not possible, therefore, to construct another savings measure
using the earlier annual income figure as there are no consumption figures to match to it.8
correlated with unobservedheterogeneity.However, if unobserved heterogeneity is to
explain our results, we should observe a systematic difference in saving rates between the
two groups. Therefore, we test the hypothesis that the two groups have the same saving
rates.
SAVINGS =SXS + YSNEW+ (3)
The fact that our sample covers years in which the saving incentives existed (1982-
1986) and years in which they did not (1987-1991) suggests another way to control for
unobserved heterogeneity.7 If unobserved heterogeneity is to explain the difference in
changes in assets and in consumption between the two groups, we should expect to find these
differences both when saving incentives were implemented and when they were not. On the
other hand, the 'reshuffling' hypothesis predicts that differences in non-IRA asset changes
between 'new' and 'old' contributors were mainly induced by the tax incentives. Therefore,
we would expect to find significant differences in the change in assets only when the
incentives were in place. Likewise, the 'new saving' hypothesis predicts significant
differences in the change in consumption only when the tax incentives were in place. We,
therefore, allow the coefficient on 'new' contributors intheperiod when the incentives were
in place to differ from the coefficient on 'new' contributors in the other period.
Our empirical model is now:




SAVING= I3sXS + yS1NEW+y(1-
S1)NEW+ (6)
7The CEX begins in 1980. We exclude the 1980-1981 period from our sample because,
although IRA contributions were tax deductible, eligibility was severely restricted prior to the
enactment of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981. The results, however, are not
affected by the addition of observations from the 1980 and 1981 surveys.9
where equals one if household i was interviewed between 1982 and 1986 and zero
otherwise.
The hypothesis of new saving implies that y1A- .12A = 0in equation (4) (and - .y2C
<0 in equation (5)). The'reshuffling' hypothesis, instead, implies that y1C -.y2C0Iii
equation (5) (and yA- 'y< 0 in equation (4)).
A finding that neither y nor 2s in equation (6) is significantly different from zero
would imply that it is unlikely that unobserved differences in tastes for saving can explain
differences between the two groups in the accumulation of financial assets other than IRA's.
A finding that y5 -.y2S=0would indicate that unobserved heterogeneity is unlikely to
explain a finding of 71A- .12A significantlyless than zero.
LV. DATA AND RESULTS
The CEX is a revolving panel dataset. Each household is interviewed four times. See
Attanasio (1994) for a complete description of the CEX dataset. Each interview contains
three months of household consumption data as well as personal and demographic
information. In addition, the first and fourth interviews contain information on income
(including IRA contributions). The fourth interview also cOnt2in information on assets and
changes in assets. Not all households complete all four interviews; a household can miss
any one (or more) of the interviews. Because of the nature of our test, however, werestrict
our sample to include only those households which complete all of the interviews. While
we are aware of the possibility that this procedure could introduce sample selection bias, we
ignore this problem.
The only variable which deserves explanation is non-durable consumption which is
defined as total consumption expenditure minus expenditure on durables, health, education
and housing. Nominal dollars are converted into 1982-1984 dollars using a Stone price index
for non-durable consumption constructed from the detailed BLS price indexes using
expenditure shares as weights.
The observable characteristics of the two groups --'new'and 'old' contributors --are10
listed in Table 1 There are several significant differences in the average level of the
observable characteristics between 'new' and 'old' IRA contributors. 'New' contributors
tend to be less educated, slightly younger, poorer, less wealthy, more likely to be black, and
have more children than 'old' contributors. This finding suggests, but does not ensure, that
there may be differences in unobservable characteristics between the two groups.
The results obtained from esthnating equations (4) to (6) can be found in Tables 2
through 4. Because consumption and savings behavior can differ dramatically over the life
cycle and the business cycle, we include as controls five age dummies, indicators for both
the number of children and the number of senior citizens in the household, a dummy for the
presence of a spouse, and annual time dummies. Because the change in consumption
between the first and the fourth interviews spans less than a year, monthly time dummies are
also included as controls in equation (5).Wealso include controls for the education level,
race, and region of residence of the households. The regional and time dummies as well as
the regression constant are not reported in the tables. Due to the presence of top-coding and..
a potentially skewed distribution of wealth, income, or consumption in our sample, we report
results using both least squares and quantile regressions.
In Table 2 we report the estimates of equation (6). As stressed above, the main
reason for looking at such an equation is to establish whether 'new' and 'old' contributors
exhibit different saving behavior during the two periods we are examining. To control for
possible differences in current andior permanent income between the two groups, we
consider the ratio of saving to non-durable consumption. This variable is a monotonic
transformation of the saving rate and has the advantage of being defined even when income
is equal to zero.
We find that the ratio of savings to non-durable consumption decreases by a tenth for
each child in the household. Surprisingly, that ratio is four-tenths higher for black
households than for non-black households. Households with a spouse present also have
higher savings rates relative to other households. Savings increases strongly with the level of
education and increases and then decreases with age. The coefficients on age are, however,
measured rather imprecisely.
Both columns of Table 2 indicate that in neither period do 'new' contributors have11
lower savings rates than 'old' contributors, indicating that unobservable differences between
the two groups is most likely not a problem. In the 1982 to 1986 period, the point estimate
of the coefficient on the 'new' contributors is somewhat smaller (in absolute value) than in
the fnllowing period. However, the difference between the coefficients on the 'new'
contributors in the two periods is not significant at the 35%level.
In Tables 3a and 3b, we report the estimates of equation (4). We use two definitions
of non-IRA assets. The first includes stocks, bonds, savings, and checking accounts, while
the second excludes savings and checking accounts. In Table 3a, the dependent variable is
the change in non-IRA assets divided by non-durable consumption while in Table 3b we
simply deflate the change by a consumer price index. Finally, we report OLS estimates as
well as quantile regressions.
We find that the presence of children leads to slower non-IRA asset growth. In
contrast to the results in Table 2, black households tend to have slower non-IRA asset growth
relative to non-black households. Asset growth increases with education and age, but the
coefficients on age are imprecisely measured.
The change in non-IRA assets of 'new' IRA contributors is significantly (statistically
and economically) lower than that of the 'old' IRA contributors during the period in which
IRA incentives were implemented (1982-1986). Furthermore, the coefficient on 'new'
contributors in the period in whih IRA incentives were implemented is significantly lower
than that in the following period in columns 2 -5 ofboth tables. This evidence supports the
hypothesis that IRA incentives caused mainly a reshuffling of existing assets, rather than
creating new saving. Our argument is supported by the evidence in Table 2 which shows no
significant differences between the total saving of 'new' contributors across the two periods.
The point estimates in Table 2, if anything, show that in the period when IRA incentives
were in place, the difference in saving rates between 'new' and 'old' contributors was
minimal and smaller than in the previous period.
One can use the results reported in Table 3 to assess the amount of IRA contributions
that represent increases in household saving and that represent new national saving. Because
medians do not aggregate, we use the OLS point estimate (from Table 3a, column 1) for this
exercise. If one assumes that 'old' contributors, having already reached an equilibrium, do12
not 'reshuffle' the stock of non-IRA assets (savings, checking, stocks, and bonds) and that
there are no income differences between 'new' and 'old' contributors, one could use the
coefficient on the new contributors dummy as an estimate of the dollar amount of
reshuffling. However, we know that 'old' contributors are, on average, richer so that the
negative coefficient on the new contributors dummy in column 1 of Table 3b could simply
reflect this effect; this difference was the main reason we used the ratio of changes in assets
to non-durable consumption rather than levels. If one ignores the covariance between the
level of consumption and the ratio of changes in asset to consumption, one can multiply the
coefficients on the 'new' contributors dummy in the first column of Table 3a by average non-
durable consumption and interpret the result as the amount of reshuffling in response to IRA
incentives. The possibility that 'old' contributors do some reshuffling implies that this
calculation should be interpreted as a lower bound on the amount of reshuffling.
Furthermore, it is also possible that IRA contributions come, at least in part, from the flow
of saving (saving that would have been done anyway) rather than from adjusting the stock.
The average real IRA contribution for households which just opened an IRA account
during the 1982 to 1986 period was $2471. The average real level of non-durable
consumption for these same households was $12093. Table 3a then implies that the percent
of IRA contributions that represent net additions to personal savings is less than 40% .
Tocalculate the effect on national saving we estimate each household's marginal tax
rate using the procedure described in MaId (1994) and compute the average loss of revenue
due to the deductability of IRA contributions. This figure is equal, for new contributors, to
$439.This implies that less than 20% of IRA contributions represented addition to national
savings. We should stress, once more, that this is an upper bound.
In Table 4, we report the estimates of equation (5).Changesin consumption are
computed as the change in real consumption expenditure between the quarters preceding the
first and last interviews. Because there is less than a year between these interviews, it is
$0.377=1-0.1272x 12093/2471.
The mean and median marginal tax rate for the sample of new contributors were 18.6%
and 20%.13
crucial to control for seasonality (as well as year effects and other demographics, as in
Tables 3). Again, we report both OLS and quantile regressions results.
We find that the presence of additional children tends to reflect faster consumption
growth at the center of the distribution, but slower growth at the upper tail. The presence of
senior citizens in the household leads to slower consumption growth. Black households and
households with a spouse present both exhibit slower consumption growth relative to other
households. The coefficients on the number of children, the number of senior citizens, and
race are all imprecisely measured, however. Consumption growth tends to increase with the
level of education and to decrease and then increase with age.
The estimates of the coefficient on the 'new' contributors dummy, once again, seem
to favor the 'reshuffling' hypothesis. There is no evidence that 'new' contributors reduced
their consumption relative to 'old' contributors during the 1982 to 1986 period. If anything,
'new' contributors exhibit positive consumption growth relative to 'old' contributors.
Importantly, the difference between the coefficients on the 'new' contributors in the two
periods is not significant at the 40% level.
V. DISCUSSION
Our analysis relies on the assumption that unobserved tastes for saving for each group
do not change with the period of IRA tax deductibility given all other explanatory variables.
ft may appear that the difference between 'new' and 'old' contributors is due to the
composition of the two groups changing with the popularity of IRA's. However, this
argument is unlikely to explain our result.
Suppose that, during the heyday of IRA's, many households that did not usually save
opened IRA accounts, perhaps due to the influence of heavy advertising. Once IRA
deductibility was removed, however, non-savers no longer opened IRA accounts. If this
were the case, then the ranks of 'new' contributors would be filled with relatively more
househOlds with low tastes for saving during the period when IRA's were tax deductible.
This fact would bias down the estimates of 'new' contributors, during the period in which14
IRAincentiveswere implemented, for the other assets equation and the savings equation and
bias p those for the consumption equation. Thus, if the deductibility of IRA's induced
otherwise marginal savers to save, this new saving potentially could be mistaken for
reshuffling.
If the above argument were true, however, we would expect saving rates to be lower
for 'new' contributors in the period when IRA's were tax deductible relative to that for the
following period. The results in Table 2 do not support this hypothesis; while it is true that
the point estimates indicate that 'new' contributors save less than 'old' ones, the effect is
particularly pronounced when saving incentives were not in place. The difference in saving
rates between the two groups is smaller when incentives were effective than they were not.
In any event, the difference between the two coefficients is not statistically different from
zero. Thus, it is unlikely that either unobserved tastes for saving or changes in these tastes
can explain our results.
Furthermore, if the above argument is true, we would expect 'new' contributors to
have observable characteristics that change over time as well. A comparison of some
observable characteristics is given in Table 5.Inthe period when IRA's were tax deductible,
'new' contributors are less educated, are more likely to be white, are less likely to contribute
to a pension, are older, and have more senior citizens in the household than 'new'
contributors during the period when IRA's were not tax deductible. The ratios of income
and wealth to consumption, however, do not change across periods. Overall, we think it is
unlikely that a potentially changing composition of 'new' contributors over time can explain
our results.
The results we report are robust to a number of experiments. As we mentioned
above, adding 1980 and 1981 to the years in which saving incentives were not implemented
does not change our results. We also tried adding changes in real income to our
specification. It is conceivable that, if 'new' contributors had faster real income growth
relat'e to 'old' contributors, 'new' contributors would exhibit faster consumption growth as
well. Failing to account for differences in real income growth between 'new' and 'old'
contributors could mask any relative decrease in consumption by 'new' contributors and
weaken the results reported in Table 4. That is, 'new' contributors could be generating new15
savings out of increases in income rather than decreases in consumption. In fact, 'new'
contributors had an average change in real income of $5548comparedto $663 for 'old'
contributors.'0 When we include changes in real income as a control variable in equation
(5),however,our results do not change; there continues to be no evidence that 'new'
contributors reduced their consumption relative to 'old' contributors during the period in
which IRA's were tax deductible.
Note that failing to account for differences in real income growth will, if anything,
strengthen the results of Tables 3a and 3b that the change in non-IRA assets of 'new'
contributors is lower than that for 'old' contributors. Again, including changes in real
income in equation (4) does not change our results.
VI. CONCLUSION
We approach the question of whether IRA contributions represent primarily new
saving or reshuffled assets by comparing the behavior of households which just opened an
IRA account to that of households which already had an IRA account. 'New' contributors
and 'old' contributors will behave differently depending upon whether their contributions
come from reduced consumption or reductions in other assets. In particular, the 'new
saving' hypothesis predicts that 'new' contributors should have slower consumption growth
than 'old' conthbutors while the 'reshuffling' hypothesis predicts that 'new' contributors
should have slower growth in non-IRA assets than 'old' contributors.
Comparing IRA contributors with non-conthbutors is problematic due to the
likelihood of unobserved heterogeneity across the two groups. We specifically account for
heterogeneity by testing the parameter restrictions implied by each hypothesis across periods
of IRA deducibility. Because neither hypothesis predicts a difference in behavior between
'new' and 'old' contributors when IRA's were not tax deductible, we can identify the effect
of IRA's separately from the effect of unobserved heterogeneity.
'°The difference is significant at the 99.9% level.16
We find that 'new' contributors have slower non-IRA asset growth relative to 'old'
contributors, and that there is no difference in consumption growth between 'new' and 'old'
contributors. Furthermore, we ftnd that there is no difference in savings behavior between
the two groups. Thus, we have strong evidence, accounting for unobserved heterogeneity, in
support of the hypothesis that from 1982 to 1986 households made contributions to IRA's
primarily from reductions in other assets and not from reduced consumption.REFERENCES
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Column (1): OLS Regression.
Column (2): Median Regressiot
Real Savings is the ratio of after-tax income less total consurtiontonon-durable consurrtion.
Also included in the regression but not reported are annual and regional dummy variables and a constant.
Standard errors are repo1ed in parenthesis.
P-Value is the result from a Wald Statistic on the hypothesis that the etficients on New Contributor(1 982-
1986=True) and New Contrib&tor(1982.1986=False) are the same.TABLE 3a: CHANGE IN NON-IRA ASSETS EQUATION
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS 75th 90th OLS 90th
NEW CONTRIBUTOR-0.1272 -0.1368 -0.2837 -0.0597 -0.2090
• (1982-1986TRUE) (0.04.43) (0.0206) (0.0680) (0.0350)(0.0153)
NEW CONTRIBUTOR-0.0269 -0.0531 -0.0949 0.0356 -0.0267
• (1982-1986FALSE) (0.0432) (0.0200) (0.0659) (0.0342)(0.0145)
NUMBER OF -0.0242 '0.0335 -0.0818 -0.0030 -0.0161
CHILDREN (0.01 82) (0.0091) (0.0299) (0.0144)(0.0064)
NUMBER OF SENIOR.0.0147 0.0796 -0.1358 0.0042 0.0384
CITIZENS (0.0623) (0.0294) (0.1013) (0.0492)(0.0203)
BLACK .0.1996 -0.1205 -0.3770 -0.0638 -0.0419
(0.0914) (0.0418) (0.1379) (0.0722)(0.0308)
SPOUSE -0.0946 -0.0354 -02404 -0.0105 -0.0009
PRESENT (0.0366) (0.0169) (0.0564) (0.0289) (0.01 27)
HIGH SCHOOL 0.0813 0.0268 0.1126 0.0377 0.0137
GRAD (0.0547) (0.0254) (0.0857) (0.0432)(0.0187)
SOME COLLEGE 0.1216 0.0512 0.1912 0.0119 0.0290
(0.0671) (0.0266) (0.0906) (0.0451)(0.0199)
COLLEGE GRAD 0.1 184 0.0994 0.3023 0.0342 0.1356
(0.0532) (0.0248) (0.0850) (0.0421)(0.0186)
AGE: 25-34 0.0833 0.0884 0.3369 0.0399 0.0440
(0.2121)(00955) (0.2971) (0.1676)(0.0657)
AGE: 35-44 0.1668 0.1074 0.4588 0.0915 0.0560
(0.2115) (0.0953) (0.2964) (0.1671)(0.0656)
AGE: 45-58 0.1416 0.0381 0.4263 0.1 171 0.0411
(0.2104) (0.0945)(02943) (0.1662)(0.0652)
AGE: 59-64 0.1925 0.0483 0.6046 0.1039 0.0290
(0.21 26)(0.0956 (0.2984) (0.1680)(0.0661)
AGE >=65 0.2271 -0.0313 0.7350 0.0486 0.0779
(02311) (0.1046) (0.3294) (0.1826) (0.0710)
P-VALUE 0.0993 0.0031 0.0419 0.0476 0.0000
Column (1): OIS regressionwherethe Real (Thange ki Assets Is defined as the Ratio ot the annual change In
stocks,government bonds, savings and cheddng accounts tonon-durableconswrctlon.
Column(2): same as (1) but a75thquantlle regression.
Column (3): same as (1) buta90th quantile regression.
Column (4): OLS regression where the Real Change In Assets Is defined as the Ratio of the annual change In
stocksand government bonds to non-durabie oorisurrt1on.
Column (5):same as (4) but a90thquantileregression.
P-ValueIsthe resultfrom a WaldStatistic on the Hothes1sthat the CoefficientsonNew Contnbutor(1982-
1986-True) and New Cont,ibutor(1982-1986..False) arethesame.TABLE 3b: CHANGE IN NON-IRA ASSETS EQUATION
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS 75th 90th OLS 90th
NEW CONTRIBUTOR.1740.1 -1713.4 -4714.7 -925.5 .2587.4
• (1982.1986TRUE) (534.2) (218.6) (862.1) (385.4) (199.1)
NEW CONTRIBUTOR -424.0 -741.5 -1197.8 238.1 -336.5
(1982-1986FALSE) (528.7) (213.8) (834.5) (381.4) (187.1)
NUMBER OF -254.7 -260.2 -612.7 -25.5 -168.3
CHILDREN (221.4) (97.5) (384.0) (159.7) (79.8)
NUMBER OF SENIOR-143.8 598.0 669.3 -333.2 204.0
CITIZENS (764.4) (315.9) (1235.1) (551.5) (272.6)
BLACK -2224.2 -996.3 -3642.5 -916.1 .529.7
(1092.7) (444.4) (1726.0) (788.4) (406.7)
SPOUSE 186.9 209.6 505.3 127.2 256.3
PRESENT (443.6) (182.0) (717.5) (320.1) (164.3)
HIGH SCHOOL 507.9 221.2 621.0 87.6 109.0
GRAD (681.4) (279.0) (1106.3) (491.7) (251.7)
SOME COLLEGE 1046.9 494.2 1501.9 244.4 281.1
(707.7) (290.4) (1166.6) (510.6) (268.5)
COLLEGE GRAD 1887.4 1045.9 4336.4 588.4 1371.3
(659.1) (270.8) (1100.4) (475.5) (251.7)
AGE: 25-34 584.2 310.7 1112.4 373.6 330.2
(2539.8) (943.4) (3726.6) (1832.4) (854.3)
AGE: 35-44 1537.1 698.5 2598.1 1017.8 336.6
(2531.3) (939.5) (3706.2) (1826.3)(851.5)
AGE: 45-58 1479.7 37.6 2308.0 1259.9 252.5
(2517.2) (933.0) (3681.8) (1816.2)(845.0)
AGE: 59-64 1595.7 96.0 3491.8 588.2 141.0
(2545.8) (946.9) (3739.0) (1836.8)(858.5)
AGE: >=65 3722.8 -66.1 5571.0 2259.9 2329.8
(2781.4) (1051.9) (4172.7) (2006.8)(929.7)
P-VALUE 0.0747 0.0012 0.0029 0.0290 0.0000
Column (1): OLS regression where the Heal change in Assets Is donned as the annual change in stocks,
government bonds, savings and checking accounts deflated by a Consumer Price Index.
Column (2): same as (1) but a 75th quantile regression.
Column (3): same as (1) but a 90th quantlle regression.
Column (4): OLS regression where the Real Change in Assets is defined as the annual change in stocks and
government bonds deflated by a Consumer Price Index.
Column (5): same as (4) but a 90th quantlle regression.
P-Value is the result from a Waid Statistic on the Hypothesis that the Coefficients on New Contributor(1982-
1986.True) and New Contiibutor(1982-1986=Faise) are the same.TABLE 4: CHANGE IN CONSUMPTION EQUATION
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS Median 75th 90th
NEW CONTRIBUTOR0.4025 0.1254 0.2187 0.6511
(1982-1986=TRUE) (0.1953) (0.0885) (0.1199) (0.2670)
NEW CONTRIBUTOR0.3266 0.2315 0.1592 0.7845
(1982-1986=FALSE) (0.2078) (0.0943) (0.1268) (0.2808)
NUMBER OF 0.0822 0.0611 -0.0315 -0.2086
CHILDREN (0.0831) (0.0377) (0.0521) (0.1209)
NUMBER OF SENIOR-0.0236 -0.2821 -0.1928 -0.7043
CITIZENS (0.2839) (0.1283) (0.1754) (0.3964)
BLACK -0.5159 -0.6482 -0.4885 -0.8389
(0.4362) (0.1974) (0.2617) (0.6037)
SPOUSE -0.3302 -0.1380 -0.6473 -1.3416
PRESENT (0.1689) (0.0766) (0.1031) (02298)
HIGH SCHOOL -0.0870 0.0646 0.1979 0.0313
GRAD (02491) (0.1130) (0.1522) (0.3382)
SOME COLLEGE 0.1626 0.0902 0.0934 0.1 247
(0.2603) (0.1180) (0.1593) (0.3515)
COLLEGE GRAD 0.3784 0.1912 0.1943 0.1992
(02415) (0.1096) (0.1474) (0.3263)
AGE: 25-34 -1.0239 -1.0316 -1.4574 0.3085
(1.0400) (0.4631) (0.5751) (1.0615)
AGE: 35-44 -0.4999 .0.6266 -1.3750 -0.0415
(1.0369) (0.4616) (0.5728) (1 .0529)
AGE: 45-58 -0.7251 -0.6298 -1 .4705 -0.1559
(1.0314) (0.4590) (0.5694 (1.0449)
AGE: 59-64 -0.1155 -0.2674 .0.8624 0.5929
(1.0406) (0.4632) (0.5763) (1.0626)
AGE: >=65 .0.2593 -0.1607 .1.0177 2.2850
(1.1201) (0.4998) (0.6306) (1.2061)
P-VALUE 0.7863 0.4031 0.7272 0.7232
Column (1): OlSRegression on log change u real total consumption between the 2nd and 5h interviews.
Realtotal consumption Is non*al consumption deflated by a consumer price index..
Column (2): same as (1) except median regression.
Column (3): same as (1) except 75th quantile regression.
Column (4): same as (1) except 90th quantile regression.
P-Value Is the result from a Wald StatistIc on the Hypothesis that the Coefficients on New Contributor(1982-
1986=True) and New Contrlbutor(1982-1986=False) are the same.TABLE 5: NEW CONTRIBUTORS ACROSS PERIODS OF TAX DEDUCTIBILITY
MEAN 1982-1986 1987-1990t-Test for
(Standard Deviation) N1014 N=1040 Equality of
Means
RATIO OF INCOME TO 2.891 2.961 -0.968
NON-DURABLE (1.718) (1.606)
CONSUMPTION
RATIO OF WEALTh TO 1.681 1.610 0.520
NON-DURABLE (3.147) (2.887)
CONSUMPTION
BLACK 0.029 0.0463 -2.181
(0.167) (0.2103)
SPOUSE 0.764 0.7384 1.374
PRESENT (0.425) (0.4397)
DROP-OUT 0.137 0.0817 4.186
(0.344) (0.2741)
HIGH SCHOOL 0.287 . 0.2861 0.041
GRAD (0.453) (0.4521)
SOME COLLEGE 0.197 0.2470 -2.793
(0.398) (0.4315)
COLLEGE GRAD 0.378 0.3851 -0.331
(0.485) (0.4868)
AGE 47.35 46.22 2.123
(12.44) (12.56)
NUMBER OF 0.701 0.7593 -1.283
CHILDREN (1.054) (1.0657)
NUMBER OF SENIOR 0.122 0.1580 -2.009
CITiZENS (0.387) (0.4538)
PENSION 0.141 0.1844 -2.740
(0.348) (0.3880)